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Introduction to Analytical Thomism
The first question that might occur to someone picking up the present volume for
the first time is, what is Analytical Thomism? This is a very good question but one
that is not easy to answer. The second part of the phrase is perhaps somewhat easier
to respond to than the first, for “Thomism” can more readily be identified as
referring to a particular corpus of thought, namely, the thought of Thomas Aquinas
and the subsequent interpretation of his ideas. Analytic philosophers, on the other
hand, are still relatively unclear about what “analytical” as in “analytic philosophy”
is or what its possible connections to Thomism might be. Does analytic philosophy,
for example, embrace a particular set of doctrines or beliefs? Most analytic
philosophers would answer no. They would insist that whatever analytic
philosophy is, and whatever its historical origins, analytic philosophy is today used
by philosophers to argue for positions running the length of the philosophical
spectrum – from various kinds of realism and idealism in metaphysics, to
empiricism and rationalism in epistemology, and to non-cognitivism and
utilitarianism in ethics. Is analytic philosophy, then, primarily a philosophical
method, a particular way of doing philosophy? Again, most analytic philosophers
would say that there is no particular method of doing analytic philosophy apart
from giving high priority to rigorous argumentation and clarity of expression. But
many philosophers (indeed, one would hope most philosophers) who would not
normally be called analytic philosophers have given priority to sound
argumentation and clarity of expression.
What, then, could analytical philosophy’s appeal be to Thomists, who certainly,
in Aquinas, have a first rate example of a rigorous and disciplined philosophical
and theological thinker? Do Analytical Thomists turn to analytic philosophy simply
in order to “pick up” helpful techniques for assisting them in the interpretative
clarification of specific aspects of Aquinas’s thought or are they more deeply drawn
to the wellsprings of analytical philosophy because they hold that an analytical
approach to philosophy, can, more effectively than traditional neo-Thomism,
illuminate our critical understanding of the deepest conceptual foundations of his
thought?
The nature of the relationship between analytic philosophy and Thomism 
raises, in the minds of many, the following line of questioning: must 
Analytical Thomists be committed to any of the traditionally framed doctrines of
Thomistic thought? Must Analytical Thomists, for example, hold a philosophic
commitment to some way(s) of rationally demonstrating (or at least defending the
possibility of) the existence of God, specifically the God of Christianity? Or, must
an Analytic Thomist, at least, be committed to supporting some form of
hylomorphism?
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These are all legitimate questions that anyone calling himself or herself an
Analytical Thomist must, in due course, address, for he or she will, most assuredly,
be pressed into addressing such questions viz. debate in the various channels of
scholarly communication. Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue, was
conceived of by us as just such a channel by which to invite well established, as
well as newer and emerging scholars, in both Europe and the United States, to
reflect on this crisscross of influence between analytic philosophy and Thomism,
whether positively or negatively. As the reader will soon find out, the contents of
this volume run the gambit of those who view the dialogue as a rapprochement
between analytical philosophy and Thomism to those who are lukewarm or
decidedly skeptical about the very possibility of a genuinely fruitful exchange of
ideas.
Conscious as we are of the need for an introduction, especially in an edited
collection, to provide the reader with something of an overview of its terrain, we
think that this goal can best be achieved by outlining, albeit very briefly, something
of the historical growth of Thomism, turning then to a brief account of how analytic
philosophy in the twentieth century can be viewed in relation to that history, before
finally turning to a further consideration of what the phrase “Analytical Thomism,”
can be taken to mean in light of this brief historical account.
The history of Thomism can usefully be divided into a number of phases. Almost
immediately after the death of Aquinas in 1274, parts of Aquinas’s philosophy met
with condemnation, first by Bishop Tempier of Paris in 1277, then by the
Dominican Robert Kilwardby and later by William de la Mare. Some of Aquinas’s
fellow Dominicans came to his defense, however, such as William of Macclesfield
and John of Paris and this resulted, fifty years later, in Aquinas’s canonization in
1323. By the time of John Capreolus in the fifteenth century, Aquinas was the
favored philosopher of the Dominicans and they began to produce commentaries
on the Summa Theologiae. These commentaries were written not only to spread
Aquinas’s teachings, but also to combat the “rival” philosophies of Scotus and
Ockham. Thus began the first phase of Thomism.
One of the consequences of the Council of Trent (1545–63) was the creation of
new religious orders like the Jesuits, who, under the influence of Ignatius of
Loyola, championed the philosophy of Aquinas. This in turn gave rise, along with
the work of the Post-Tridentine Dominicans, to a new phase of Thomist thought,
dominated by the commentaries of Cajetan, John of St Thomas, and the Jesuit
works of Domingo de Soto, Luis de Molina and Francesco Suarez. By the time
Aquinas had been named a Doctor of the Church in the sixteenth century, the 
two main schools of Thomistic thought were the Dominican in Italy and the 
Jesuit in Spain. This promising second phase of Thomism would end,
unfortunately, in a heated dispute between these two schools over the vexed issue
of grace and free will.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Thomism can be said to have
fallen on “hard times” and nothing of any real enduring value was really produced
by the Thomists of these centuries. By the late eighteenth and early nineteen
centuries, however, something of a renewal and revitalization of Thomism began
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under with the work of such thinkers as Tommaso Zigliara and Joseph Kleutgen,
culminating in 1879 in Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris. As John Haldane has
noted in “Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy,” the rebirth of
Thomistic philosophy which Aeterni Patris occasioned, looked in two directions:
(i) the “problematic” which sought to use the philosophy of Aquinas to respond to
the philosophical challenges of the day, such as the idealism stemming from
Descartes and Kant or the empiricism of Hume, and (ii) the “historical” which
sought to use the latest techniques of textual analysis and historical research to
uncover the “true” Aquinas by stripping away the accretions of later interpreters
such as Cajetan and John of St Thomas.1
Neither approach, of course, was without difficulties, but the most daunting task
fell to those who wished to use Aquinas’s insights to meet the philosophical
challenges of the day. For one thing, these Thomists could not help but be
influenced by the very philosophies they wished to engage. Though they were
convinced of the essential correctness of many of Aquinas’s basic philosophical
theses, they could also appreciate the many insights of the philosophers and
philosophies that they ultimately came to reject. They could see, in other words,
that some of these ideas could actually be used to support, clarify and further
advance some of Aquinas’s basic philosophical and theological positions. Thus in
Poland, for instance, the phenomenology of Husserl and his interpreters like
Roman Ingarden, along with the work of Max Scheler, were incorporated in various
ways into the philosophy of Aquinas, often with fruitful results. The most famous
and successful example of this particular marriage was, of course, Karol Wojtyla’s
The Acting Person.2
Trying to effect a rapprochement or even synthesis between different
philosophies is something of a “tricky business” and always runs the risk (charge) of
distorting the philosophies being synthesized, as happened, in the eyes of many, with
the development in the twentieth century, of “Transcendental Thomism.” Kant had
had a major impact on the thinking of many Thomists, and though most were
inclined to reject Kantian idealism, some, such as Pierre Rousselot and Joseph
Marechal, embraced the Kantian turn toward the subject. Marechal, in particular,
found the starting point for metaphysics in the subject. He claimed, however, that
Kant had failed to see that only an Infinite Being can ground or guarantee the
phenomenal object. Kant had failed, in other words, to see that the inner dynamism
of the operative intellect in the very synthesizing formation of the object of
consciousness, required an absolute terminus. In effect, Marechal believed that
Aquinas’s metaphysical critique of the object could be successfully transplanted into
Kant’s transcendental critique of the object. Although Marechal’s transcendental
version of Thomism certainly had some very notable followers, for example,
Bernard Lonergan, most Thomists (and Kantians) rejected this amalgamation of
Aquinas and Kant as being an unworkable distortion of both philosophies.3
Other Thomists, influenced by continental philosophy, were, perhaps, able to
effect more successful engagements between Thomism and other traditions of
thought. Names that immediately come to mind here are Jacques Maritain and
Étienne Gilson. These two thinkers generated a school of Thomism indebted to late
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nineteenth and early twentieth century secular French philosophy (particularly
French existentialism) and it became known as “Existential Thomism.”
Working initially under the influence of Henri Bergson and Maurice Blondel,
Maritain’s conversion to Catholicism, and his subsequent study of the texts of
Aquinas under the guidance of his French Dominican mentor Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, led him to embrace a version of Thomism based to a large extent on the
commentaries of Cajetan and John of St Thomas. Maritain’s many books reflected
what he took to be the perennial themes of Aquinas’s philosophy, such as the
primacy of a metaphysics of esse understood as the act of being (actus essendi); the
necessity for an intuition of metaphysical being as the proper starting point for
Thomistic metaphysics; and in epistemology, the importance of the notion of truth
as adequation. Though Maritain, in his philosophy, was certainly committed to
many of Aquinas’s basic philosophical and theological propositions, he did not
hesitate to draw on and adapt the secular philosophies of the day if he felt that they
could support, clarify or advance his understanding of Aquinas’s basic positions.
This is evident, for example, in his The Degrees of Knowledge,4 where he
repeatedly marshals the instrumentalist views of such philosophers of science as
Emile Meyerson, Emile Picard, Pierre Duhem, Arthur Eddington and James Jeans,
in support of his perinoetic/dianoetic distinction in the order of knowledge.
Maritain did not hesitate to use his knowledge of French existentialism to bolster
his interpretation of some of Aquinas’s key metaphysical positions. 
Some critics (Gilson among them) insisted that Maritain’s interpretation of
Aquinas’s metaphysics, indebted as it was to the Dominican commentators, was
too essentialist in tone and therefore missed the existential thrust of Aquinas’s
metaphysics of esse. For Gilson, faithful to the texts of Aquinas as he believed
himself to be, it was not simply Maritain’s use of the commentators that was so
troubling, it was Maritain’s reliance on what Gilson took to be a kind of inverted
Bergsonian intuitionism. For Gilson, there is no such thing as an intuition of
metaphysical being, nor can anything like it be found in the texts of Aquinas. As he
strove to argue in Being and Some Philosophers,5 Aquinas’s metaphysics is built on
the understanding that being primarily means esse or existence, a being’s act of
existing, which is not to be confused with its essence. As such, esse cannot be
grasped via simple apprehension and so cannot be known through a concept. Esse
can only be captured or known in judgments of existence. In order to be thought
conceptually and raised to the metaphysical level, esse must be rejoined to essence
and then brought under the operations of (i) abstraction, and (ii) separation in the
form of a special negative judgment. For Gilson, our ability to know esse is
dependent on, and grounded in, pre-conceptual sensory experience. And yet, for all
his adherence to Aquinian textual authority, there is no doubt that Gilson wrote
Being and Some Philosophers with his eye on the growing popularity of French
existentialism and was also significantly influenced by it.
Thus by the mid-twentieth century there were at least three well developed
schools of Thomism that sought to address the philosophical challenges of the day
by effecting a rapprochement or synthesis with Aquinas’s thought – (i) the Lublin
school in Poland, (ii) Transcendental Thomism and (iii) Existential Thomism. 
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Of those who chose the overtly historicist path, in the twentieth century, we can
but note here the work of Joseph Owens in Canada, John Wippel in the United
States, and in Europe the expository scholarship of the well known “Participation
Thomists” – Cornelio Fabro and Louis Geiger.
While renewed interest in Aquinas’s philosophy resulted in the creation of new
schools of Thomism, along with the creation of considerable first rate historical
scholarship, Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris also had the unfortunate effect of
reinforcing a manualistic style of presenting Aquinas’s thought that had first arisen
in the decades following the Council of Trent. The Catholic Church at that time had
a strong need to systematize doctrine in the face of the growing challenges of the
Protestant faith. To that end, and because Aquinas’s philosophy played a major role
in the Catholic Church’s response to Luther and Calvin, Catholic theologians
devised manuals that sought to summarize Aquinas’s arguments and conclusions in
ways that could be more readily absorbed by Catholic seminarians and deployed
apologetically. Useful, perhaps, in their own limited way, these manuals became the
standard method of presenting Aquinas’s thought in the post-Tridentine Church.
When Leo XIII made Aquinas the “official” philosopher of the Catholic Church
in 1879 (to be utilized, at the time, as an intellectual force against the challenges of
modernism), he inadvertently created a need for more manuals of Thomistic
instruction. Whatever their value to seminarians, the continued use of manuals, as
well as the manual style of instruction in Catholic seminaries and colleges in the
twentieth century, did more than anything else to give Thomism and Aquinas a
“bad name” among non-Catholic philosophers. These manuals were often
decidedly dogmatic, uncritical and dismissive of competing views. Since their
primary purpose was to indoctrinate, they, at best, contained little in the way of
redeeming philosophical value.
Consequently, in spite of the creation of new schools of syncretic Thomism after
Aeterni Patris, the manual style of privileged pleading, alas, became all too readily
identified with Thomism in general. If that was the thought of Aquinas, non-
Catholic philosophers argued, then it was not really worth the trouble of getting to
know it any further.
Distrust of Thomism and Thomists was thus widespread among non-Catholic
philosophers in the twentieth century. If distrust of Thomists was strong among the
continental philosophers, it was even stronger among analytic philosophers.
Analytic philosophy had, early on, acquired a reputation for being a tough minded,
no-nonsense approach to philosophy, whose practitioners tended to come from
backgrounds in logic, mathematics and the hard sciences. It had also acquired a
reputation, early on, for being dismissive of metaphysics (at least certain “bad”
kinds) as well as being hostile to religion and values.
Although today’s analytic philosophers are quick to point out that such a
reputation was only, in part, deserved, both the early Wittgenstein and Russell
developed philosophies whose main task was the reductive analysis of ordinary
language into what they called its true logical content, which ordinary language
obscured. Now the true logical content of ordinary language was comprised of
complex propositions and elementary statements of fact. Since the latter were held
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to represent the world as it truly is, ordinary language claims that could not be so
reduced or re-written, were simply dismissed as being “metaphysical” (in the bad
sense) or “value-laden” claims. Of course, Wittgenstein and Russell certainly had
their own ontologies, but it was the reductive aspect of these philosophies that most
appealed to their positivist successors, who would ultimately give expression to
that reductionism in the form of the verification principle of meaning.
By the 1930s, then, analytic philosophy was not inclined to give any sympathetic
ear to the voice of Aquinas, dependent as it was on “bad” metaphysics. Whatever
their disagreements with Frege’s supposed Platonism, virtually all analytic
philosophers of the period agreed with Frege’s assessment of existence, that “An
affirmation of existence is in fact nothing other than a denial of the number zero.”6
Consequently, no self respecting analytic philosopher of the period could, in good
conscience, embrace a philosophy such as Aquinas’s, a philosophy that repeatedly
made the mistake of treating existence as a real property, rather than as a second
order property of concepts. Nor, of course, were Thomists inclined to give any
major thought to analytic philosophy, convinced as they were (wrongly, as it turned
out) of analytic philosophy’s hopelessly anti-metaphysical bias.
Breaking out of its short lived love affair with logical positivism, analytic
philosophy would, however, soon open up to other influences and these would
eventually lead to its becoming the multifaceted philosophical community of
discourse that it is today. Perhaps the most important change in this regard was
effected by Wittgenstein himself, when he abandoned his earlier view of language
as the mirror of reality and embraced instead a multi-functional theory of language
where use determines meaning. For Wittgenstein, the task of philosophy was no
longer to uncover the structures of the world through a reductive analysis of the
logical structure of language, but to describe the history of language’s use. The
work of the later Wittgenstein, along with the breakdown of the verificationist
principle of meaning, led to the near fall of logical positivism. After the fall of
logical positivism, many analytic philosophers, released from this particular
philosophical straitjacket, turned to such thinkers as Aristotle, and even Aquinas,
for fresh philosophical inspiration and insight. Emerging conditions thus started to
arise that would set the scene for the first stage appearances of what would,
belatedly, become known as “Analytic Thomism.”
Of course, as historians of analytic philosophy have pointed out,7 analytic
philosophy, from its very inception, was informed by ideas that Aquinas would
have agreed with. Frege, for example (in spite of his take on existence), defended
the objectivity of knowledge, and Brentano (in some ways the father of analytic
philosophy) championed the intentionality of mental states, a Scholastic idea
traceable to Aquinas himself. Hence much of the support for one side of a central
debate in analytic philosophy, namely, the realist/anti-realist debate, was indebted
to a medieval philosopher with a Scholastic and Aristotelian background.
As analytic philosophy began to “morph” in the 1950s, it’s center of operations
began to move from Cambridge to Oxford, with the work of Gilbert Ryle and J. L.
Austin. Though typically not associated with Aquinas in any way, both practiced
philosophy in the spirit of Aristotle, with Ryle attacking Cartesianism in his The
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Concept of Mind8 and Austin undertaking anthropological investigations in his
“Plea for Excuses”9 that are decidedly reminiscent of Aristotle’s method of
approach. Hence these two thinkers, each in his own way, caused analytic
philosophers to look more carefully at ancient sources.
One of the most pressing areas where renewal, via a reexamination of ancient
sources, was felt to be sorely needed, was in ethics. Logical positivism had left
ethics dependent on emotivism, non-cognitivism and utilitarianism. Their only
opposition came from proponents of various tired versions of Kantian deontology.
It took someone of the philosophical stature of Elizabeth Anscombe to break the
impasse. She would do so by bringing virtue ethics back into the mainstream of
ethical discussion. Anscombe’s 1958 article “Modern Moral Philosophy,”10
marked the beginning of a small but influential movement within analytic
philosophy to make virtue ethics respectable once again. According to Anscombe,
the only way to overcome the limitations of emotivism, behaviorism, utilitarianism
and Kantianism, was to seek to rehabilitate the whole notion of virtue.
If Anscombe sought to challenge the general condition that ethical discourse 
had reached by the mid-twentieth century, instigating something of an analytic 
shift towards renewed interest in Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics, Peter Geach,
Anscombe’s husband, also had a major impact on the analytic turn toward interest
in Aquinas. Geach was, like many analytic philosophers, primarily a logician,
whose Mental Acts (1958)11 attacked both abstractionism and dispositionalism as
credible positions governing the structure of mental acts. Geach in particular
attacked Ryle’s The Concept of the Mind. Here Geach objected, on logical grounds,
to Ryle’s seemingly behaviorist account of mental acts. Mental acts, said Geach,
are logically distinct from mental events. Geach also rejected what he took to be the
standard reading of Aquinas on abstractionism, which, for Geach, boiled down to a
kind of psychologis – the mind possesses a “sense” that enables it to consult its own
inner experience, from which the “sense” in question then abstracts mental
concepts. According to Geach, the mind does not simply abstract concepts that are
exact or identical copies of things; the mind in some sense generates concepts. In
other words, the mind uses its concept-forming power to know intelligibles, but the
intelligibles that it knows are in part due to the power of the mind to know them.12
Mental Acts, then, along analytic lines, can be seen to make a significant
contribution to a Thomistic understanding of an important foundational concept in
the philosophy of mind.
This does not complete this sketch of Geach’s seminal contribution to the rise of
“Analytical Thomism,” for his chapter on Aquinas in Three Philosophers,13 co-
written with Elisabeth Anscombe, is of crucial significance. That chapter
represented a selective examination of themes central to Aquinas’s philosophy and
sought to clarify mistaken interpretations of Aquinas’s thought in much the same
spirit as Mental Acts. One of these, which would become a key focus for other
Analytical Thomists, following Geach, is the often overlooked distinction that
Aquinas makes between esse, or being, and existence in the an est sense. Confusing
the two, argued Geach, is said to lead to a big conceptual muddle about God’s
essence being the same as his existence.
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Another major figure in the analytic turn toward ancient and medieval
philosophy, and Aquinas in particular, was Anthony Kenny. Kenny was a Catholic
priest who studied at the Gregorian University in Rome in the 1950s. Among his
professors were Peter Hoenen and Bernard Lonergan, whom he says, both aroused
his interest in Aquinas’s philosophy. His interest in Aquinas was further energized
when he went to study with Peter Geach and Herbert McCabe at Oxford. Some of
the first fruits of that study were Action, Emotion, and Will (1963),14 Aquinas: A
Collection of Critical Essays (1969)15 and Will, Freedom and Power (1975),16 all
of which show, in various ways, Kenny’s indebtedness to Aquinas’s thought.
Aquinas’s influence is particularly evident in Kenny’s The Metaphysics of Mind
(1989).17 In this work, Kenny draws upon many elements whose intellectual roots
are to be found in Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. Kenny, for example, deftly shows
how Aquinas’s understanding of the relation between intellect and will, body and
soul, has much to offer contemporary analysts grappling with the same problems.18
Kenny’s later work, Aquinas on Being,19 examines Aquinas’s theory of being in
the light of Frege’s philosophy and modern linguistic analysis. Here the
contribution Kenny makes now works in the opposite direction, for contemporary
analytical philosophy, as Kenny sees it, shows how Aquinas’s theory of being is, at
bottom, fundamentally incoherent in its basic metaphysical underpinnings.
Finally, the growing interest of a minority of analytic philosophers in the
philosophy of Aquinas, following in the wake of Anscombe, Geach and Kenny,
caused John Haldane, one of the leading lights of British analytic thought, and
himself a Catholic philosopher very interested in Aquinas, to label this approach to
philosophy “Analytical Thomism.” Haldane, spurred on by the fruits of the labor of
Anscombe, Geach and Kenny, has, in effect, called for a fourth renewal of Thomism,
which would take its revitalization from a thoroughgoing dialogue with the method
and concerns of analytic philosophy. For Haldane, such a renewal is the only way to
save Thomism from, (i) useful but limited historical expositions of Aquinas’s
philosophy, and (ii) the not very rigorous neo-Thomist philosophy coming from the
successors to Gilson, Maritain and the transcendentalists. Haldane believes that
analytic philosophy has much to offer Thomism, and that were Aquinas alive today,
he would in fact be something of an analytic philosopher. To this end, Haldane has
published a number of influential papers, helping to generate interest among some
philosophers (not all Catholics by any means) as to the importance of advancing this
agenda. A significant contribution to this research was made in a 1997 issue of The
Monist,20 the whole of which was devoted to the subject of Analytical Thomism. It is
there, in the Prefatory Note, that Haldane gives us a working definition of Analytical
Thomism, one which enables us, at last, to supply the reader with at least a broad
working definition of what the phrase “Analytical Thomism” stands for:
Analytical Thomism is not concerned to appropriate St. Thomas for the advancement of
any particular set of doctrines. Equally, it is not a movement of pious exegesis. Instead, it
seeks to deploy the methods and ideas of 20th century philosophy – of the sort dominant
within the English speaking world – in connection with the broad framework of ideas
introduced and developed by Aquinas.21
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That issue of the Monist was followed by another of Haldane’s articles that also
helped promote the call for dialogue between Thomism and analytic philosophy,
this time published in New Blackfriars (vol. 80, 1999), as “Thomism and the Future
of Catholic Philosophy.”22 The New Blackfriars article, further articulating
Haldane’s call for a cross fertilization between analytic philosophy and Thomism,
is followed by twelve responses from philosophers and theologians who are, for the
most part, sympathetic to the broad thrust of Haldane’s call.
Our volume, Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue, seeks to further that
trend in dialogue by adding to the small list of contributions published in this
relatively new field of philosophy. The editors believe that Haldane’s project has
considerable merit, that analytic philosophy has much to offer Thomists and others
interested in the thought of Aquinas, and that Thomists ignore the latest
developments in analytic philosophy at their peril. We also maintain that Haldane is
“on target” concerning the present state of Scholastic philosophy, for it is once
again in need of renewal. That renewal, of course, need not necessarily come from
analytic philosophy alone, but surely as one of the dominant approaches to
philosophy in the world these past decades, analytic philosophy must surely play a
major part in this renewal. 
As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the ensuing dialogue over 
“future prospects” is lively and spirited. Many of the contributors take various
concepts active in analytic philosophy and apply them to problems that are of deep
concern to analytic philosophers and Thomists alike. Thus chapters appear on 
the metaphysics/theory of being; meta-ethics, free will and determinism, natural
theology, philosophical anthropology/philosophical psychology, natural law theory,
and so on.
There has never been a time when Thomism was not in dialogue with the
philosophies of the day and Thomists have always (even the historicists) viewed
Aquinas through the interpretative lenses of their own philosophical and cultural
milieu. This was true in every historical phase of Thomism; during the time of the
earliest commentators combating Scotus and Ockham; during the time of Cajetan
and John Poinsot, and the Jesuit appropriators of Aquinas after Trent; during the
time of the traditionalists and ontologists in the eighteenth century; during the time
of Zigliara and Kluetgen in the nineteenth century, and certainly after Aeterni
Patris. Far from destroying Thomism, however, we strongly believe that this kind
of “mingling” has always eventually brought about a renewal of Thomistic thought
updating its contextual relevance as well as furthering its conceptual advancement.
Dialogue, if genuine, ought to go out of its way to include the opinions of those
who may dissent from a positive understanding of the need for a fourth Thomistic
renewal via engagement with analytic philosophy. Other articles in this volume
reflect the response of some neo-Thomists to the work of Analytic Thomists.
Needless to say, not all neo-Thomists are convinced of the compatibility of these
two philosophical approaches. Few traditional neo-Thomists, as yet, are
sympathetic to Haldane’s mission, as we see in the chapters by Brian Shanley,
Stephen Theron and John Knasas. It has to be noted, here, that most of the interest
in Analytic Thomism, so far, has come from the side of analysis, not Thomism. As
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its relatively short history shows, most of the people working in this field have
found their way into Analytical Thomism from analytical philosophy; few have yet
to find their way into Analytical Thomism from neo-Thomism. Given that the
dialogue is still in its early stages, perhaps this demographic, given time, will
change.
Be that as it may, perhaps the real value of a volume like this lies in its having, at
the very least, drawn the attention of neo-Thomists to the work of analysts who use
analytic philosophy to argue for many of the positions that Aquinas defended, and
who as a result may now decide to look more carefully at the many riches of
analytic philosophy itself. Clearly the former have found much that is of value in
Aquinas. At the same time, we hope, Analytical Thomists too will consider, more
carefully, the objections to Analytical Thomism raised by neo-Thomists and seek,
in future, to more fully address them.
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